Twyne AAVE operators

The leverage and deleverage operators that use Euler as the flashloan provider first enable the controller via EVC.enableController() and then disable it via EVC.disableController(), which is incorrect, since the controller must disable itself.

120:         eulerFL_items[0] = IEVC.BatchItem({
121:             targetContract: address(EULER_EVC),
122:             onBehalfOfAccount: address(0),
123:             value: 0,
124:             data: abi.encodeCall(IEVC.enableController, (address(this), address(targetVault)))
125:         });
...          ...
147:         // 5) Disable controller
148:         eulerFL_items[4] = IEVC.BatchItem({
149:             targetContract: address(EULER_EVC),
150:             onBehalfOfAccount: address(0),
151:             value: 0,
152:             data: abi.encodeCall(IEVC.disableController, (address(this)))
153:         });

Low. The controller is not properly disabled and will remain enabled after the leverage or deleverage call.

In LeverageOperator_EulerFL and DeleverageOperator_EulerFL, change the last element of the Euler batch and call disableController() directly through the targetVault / collateralAsset.

Fixed in PR#204.

The following comment in onFlashLoan() hints that an automatic pull of assets would settle the Euler debt. However, repayment is explicitly performed using collateralAsset.repay().

177:         // Collateral asset will automatically pull the repayment amount

Informational.

Remove the comment.

Fixed in PR#206.

The teleport operation takes the debtAmount as user input and forwards that amount when repaying the debt using AAVE_POOL.repay(). Given that the inner implementation of repay() silently limits the repayment amount to the actual debt, using a higher amount would result in a leftover in the operator.

Informational.

Cap debtAmount to the user's current debt.

Fixed in PR#208.

The LeverageOperator_EulerFL and DeleverageOperator_EulerFL contracts refer to Morpho when checking the caller in the flashloan callbacks.

• LeverageOperator_EulerFL.sol#L169
• DeleverageOperator_EulerFL.sol#L151

Informational.

Rename the error.

Fixed in PR#207.

The executeTeleport() function inside AaveV3TeleportOperator adds 10 wei to the Morpho flashloan amount. It's unclear why this value is added, especially if a user already provides the full debt amount or type(uint256).max.

Inside onMorphoFlashLoan(), debtAmount is used for repayment which ignores this 10 wei addition, resulting in useless extra wei being flashloaned.

Informational.

Remove the + 10 from the call.

Fixed in PR#205.

The implementation of executeDeleverage() returns the leftovers to the caller without checking if the actual amounts are zero.

134:         IERC20(targetAsset).safeTransfer(msgSender, IERC20(targetAsset).balanceOf(address(this)));
135:         IERC20(underlyingCollateral).safeTransfer(msgSender, IERC20(underlyingCollateral).balanceOf(address(this)));

Gas savings.

Check if balances are zero before transferring the assets.

Acknowledged.